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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN L. SANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, BELNAP FREIGHT 
LINES, and THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10235 
This case is based upon a Writ of Review which 
the Plaintiff obtained in this Court on September 
22, 1964, and in which the Plaintiff and her attor-
ney have requested this Court to review a decision 
and .order of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case relates to the results of an accident 
which occurred on January 18, 1962, in which the 
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Plaintiff, Marian L. Sanderson, slipped and fell on 
some stairs at the premises of her employer, Belnap 
Freight Lines, Salt Lake City. In this brief, we are 
defending the Industrial Commission's decision 
dated July 1, 1964, in which the Commission ordered 
the Defendants to pay certain medical expenses in-
curred by Marian L. Sanderson prior to June 13, 
1962, and workmen's compensation to and including 
February 12, 1962, and in which the Commission 
denied any payments for any later periods. R. 141) 
We agree partly with the statement of facts 
contained in the Brief of Plaintiff, but that state-
ment contains considerable argument and inferences 
which we feel are not justified or proper. It would 
probably clarify the situation if we here set out the 
basic facts without any inferences or argumentation. 
On April 4, 1963, applicant's attorney, Mr. 
Farr, sent a letter to the Industrial Commission, 
which was in the nature of an application for bene-
fits to his client, Marian L. Sanderson, relating to 
her accident of January 18, 1962 in the employ of 
Belnap Freight Lines. (R. 17) As the workmen's 
compensation insurer of Belnap, the State Insur-
ance Fund had already paid for Mrs. Sanderson 
certain amounts of medical and hospital expense and 
had paid her workmen's compensation at the rate 
of $41.75 per week from January 21 to January 
30, 1962, and from February 5 to February 12, 1962 
inclusive. The Fund also later paid all bills for her 
treatment during the entire period from January 
18, 1962 to June 13, 1962. 
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On April 15, 1963, the Industrial Commission 
referred the medical aspects of the case to a Medical 
Panel consisting of Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Dr. W. 
E. Hess and Dr. L. N. Ossman. (R. 21) The Panel 
made its first report to the Industrial Commission 
in its letter of July 17, 1963. (R. 32-36) 
On August 8, 1963, applicant's attorney sent 
to the Commission a letter (R. 41-43), containing 
objections to said Panel's report. He also requested 
the Commission to appoint on the Panel a neurolo-
gist and a medical doctor specializing in internal 
medicine. 
On August 12, 1963, the Industrial Commission 
returned the case to the Medical Panel and added 
to the panel Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a neurologist, 
and Dr. Alan E. Lindsay, an internal medicine spe-
cialist. ( R. 44) 
The Medical Panel, now consisting of five phy-
sicians, specialists in their fields, made its report to 
the Industrial Commission on October 18, 1963. (R. 
57-59) This Panel report was objected to by Mrs. 
Sanderson's attorney in his letter to the Industrial 
Commission dated November 21, 1963. (R. 45-47) 
The Industrial Commission held a formal hearing on 
February 10, 1964. (R. 69-137) The Commission 
then rendered its decision in the form of an order 
dated July 1, 1964. (R. 140-141) The Plaintiff ap-
pealed from the Order of the Commission. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECI-
SION DENYING APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS AFTER JUNE 13, 
1962, AND DENYING HER CLAIM FOR COM-
PENSATION FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL 
DISABILITY, WAS PROPER AND WAS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE REC-
ORD. 
In paragraph 3 of his Petition for Writ of 
Review, Plaintiff's attorney charged that the Indus-
trial Commission's order of July 1, 1964 (1) failed 
to resolve the issues; ( 2) did not rate the Plaintiff 
for permanent partial disability; ( 3) limited the 
liability of the employer to the period of time ending 
June 13, 1962; and ( 4) denied claimant any further 
compensation. 
The Commission did "resolve the issues." Some 
of them were resolved in favor of applicant's claim; 
and some of them were resolved against her claim. 
The Plaintiff by her appeal objects to those parts 
of the Commission's order which resolved certain 
issues against her claim. 
The Commission's decision of July 1, 1964, (R. 
140), recited the Medical Panel's actions and find-
ings and conclusions in the case, and then said, (R. 
141): 
The Commission accepts the Panel re-
port. 
The Commission concludes that applicant 
should receive compensation for time lost from 
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work because of the injury to and including 
June 13, 1962, and that all related medical 
and hospital bills to and including June 13, 
1962 should be paid by carrier. She should not 
be rated for permanent partial disability be-
cause there is no objective evidence of perma-
nent disability as a result of the accident. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 
defendants pay applicant temporary total 
compensation at the rate of $41.75 per week 
from January 21, 1962 to February 12, 1962, 
if not already paid, and all medical and hospi-
tal bills to and including the 13th day of June, 
1962. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any 
claim at this time for permanent partial dis-
ability because of the injury to the back is and 
same is hereby denied. 
There is ample evidence in the record to sup-
port the foregoing decision and order of the Commis-
sion. (R. 140-141) Both Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson 
and Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, who testified at the Com-
mission's hearing, (R. 72-107), were members of 
the Medical Panel which had made its report to the 
Commission dated October 18, 1963, and which was 
received by the Commission on November 5, 1963. 
(R. 57-59) 
Reference was made in Plaintiff's brief (PB-8) 
to the testimony of Dr. Hebertson, ·a member of the 
Panel, that Applicant had a 5.7'o·loss of bodily func-
tion as far as her arm was concerned. It is submitted 
that a fair reading of the testimony of Dr. Hebert-
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son (R-80-81) will show that the doctor was refer-
ring only to the subjective complaints of the Plain-
tiff, and that objectively he did not find any perma-
nent partial disability. 
Dr. Hebertson testified ( R. 80) that there was 
no objective evidence of loss of function of Mrs. 
Sanderson's central or peripheral nervous system, 
which might have been the result of her injuries of 
January 18 ,1962. That also was substantially one 
of the findings and conclusions contained in the 
Panel report. (R. 59) 
Dr. Hebertson testified in answering Mr. Farr's 
questions, (R. 80-81): 
Q. Was there any subjective evidence? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the subjective evidence? 
A. The pain which was present over the 
patient's head and neck, her decreasing grip 
in the left hand, and the loss of feeling over 
the left side of the face and left upper extrem-
ity. 
Q. Any other evidence, sir? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. As far as objective and subjective evi-
dence, is one any more valid than the other in 
determining the disability? 
A. I think so. Objective evidence is ~~­
ways more valid than subjective evidence In 
determining disability. 
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At R. 84, Mr. Farr further questioned Dr. He-
bertson: 
Q. Has there been any significant loss of 
function of arm or hand of Mrs. Sanderson? 
A. Yes. Subjectively, yes. 
Q. To what extent, sir? 
A. Again that is purely subjective, or 
purely on the part of the patient, and I could 
not determine it. I would have to accept her 
word purely in that regard, because objective-
ly I can find no loss of function in the ex-
tremity. 
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, an M.D. specializing in 
orthopedic surgery, who was the chairman of the 
Medical Panel in this case, testified regarding the 
procedure of .the Panel in performing its functions 
under the provisions of Section 35-1-77 of the Work-
men's Compensation Law. (R. 93) The Referee 
(Commissioner Wiesley), asked him: 
Q. Now tell us your procedure in getting 
together. 
A. When I receive one of these Panels, I 
review the entire record and make up a sum-
mary of all the pertinent factors from the rec-
ord. If it appears that there are any reports 
that are not present in the record, any doctors 
that have seen the patient from whom we do 
not have reports, or any other information 
that we can detect might have a bearing on 
it, we attempt to obtain all of this informa-
tion. In addition we obtain all of the X-rays 
that can be obtained that had been taken on 
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the case. Then this information is all summar-
ized. The X-rays, the Industrial Commission 
file and the summary are sent to each Panel 
member prior to the meetings, so that he can 
review them and become acquainted with the 
case. The applicant is then called in. We, be-
fore examining the applicant, go over all of 
the previous material. The applicant is then 
interviewed. That is a history is taken regard-
ing their entire story, involving their alleged 
accident and the symptoms, and the treatment, 
and the applicant is then examined. Follow-
ing that the Panel then goes over the findings, 
and reaches the conclusions. The report is then 
typed up, sent - or taken, actually taken -
to each Panel member individually, for his 
signature. 
In answering Mr. Farr's questions on cross-
examination, (R. 96-97), Dr. Holbrook testified re-
garding the occasions when the members of the Med-
ical Panel made examinations of Mrs. Sanderson's 
head and neck and back, etc. : 
Q. Now did you examine Marian Sander-
son, doctor? 
A. Yes. Well, I should say that I did not 
personally examine Marian Sanderson. * * * 
I was present at both of the examinations. 
These are done each time with all as previous-
ly described. All of the members of the Panel 
examined the patient together. * * *Obviously 
every member of the Panel does not perform 
every examination test. They are done as a 
group examination, and I was a part of the 
group that examined Mrs. Sanderson on two 
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occasions. * * * As Chairman, the various por-
tions of this examination were delegated to 
the specialists involved, and I acted as r~cord­
er, writing d?wn the findings and the history 
that we obtained. 
Plaintiff has taken the position that the Com-
mission, in following the findings of the Medical 
Panel, acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers. 
It is claimed throughout Plaintiff's Brief that the 
report of the Medical Panel should be considered as 
only an "exhibit" and not as evidence. 
Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953 in providing for 
the Medical Panel and in setting forth the procedure 
to be followed if objections to the findings of the 
Panel are made is as follows: 
If objections to such report are filed it 
shall be the duty of the Commission to set the 
case for hearing within thirty days to deter-
mine the facts and issues involved, and at such 
hearing any party so desiring may request the 
Commission to have the Medical Panel or any 
of its members present at the hearing for ex-
amination and cross-examination. Upon such 
hearing the written report of the panel may 
be received as an exhibit but shall not be con-
sidered as evidence in the case except insofar 
as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. 
In this case Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, who had been 
appointed Chairman of the Medical Panel to investi-
gate the medical aspects involved, was present at 
the hearing held on February 10, 1964 and was 
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called upon to testify. Dr. Holbrook identified the 
signatures on the panel report (R. 92, 103, 104). He 
then explained how the Panel proceeded to determine 
the medical aspects of the case ( R. 93). His testi-
mony has been set out in full earlier in this brief. 
Upon cross-examination by counsel he explained in 
detail the examination \vhich was made of the medi-
cal reports and of the applicant, the Plaintiff herein, 
(R. 94-103). Later, in response to questioning by 
counsel for the State Insurance Fund, he testified 
as follows relative to the Panel report: 
Q. And you concurred and agreed with 
the other doctors that the statements of the 
facts specified in this report and the conclu-
sions which you arrived at - particularly 
those set out in the latter part of the report 
- are your opinions and findings? 
A. I concur with these, yes. 
Q. And you still have that same opinion? 
A. I do. 
The above quoted portion of Section 35-1-77, 
U.C.A., 1953, sets forth that the Medical Panel re-
port shall be received "as an exhibit, but shall not 
be considered as evidence in the case except insofar 
as it is sustained by the testimony admitted." The 
testimony of Dr. Holbrook, as Chairman of the Panel, 
upon the careful examination of him by Plaintiff's 
counsel and by counsel for the State Insurance Fund, 
did sustain the contents of the Medical Panel report, 
particularly the findings thereof, and that the re-
port having been sustained by the testimony of the 
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doctors, the Medical Panel report became and was 
properly considered as evidence by the Commission. 
Dr. Hebertson also testified to the same effect (R. 
72, 87). 
Plaintiff's brief cites the case of Hackjord vs. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 358 P. 2d. 899, 11 
U. 2d. 312, in support of the argument that neither 
the Commission nor the employer introduced the tes-
timony required by Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953 
as amended. In the Hack ford case, although the mem-
bers of the Medical Panel were present at the hear-
ing none of them were examined, either by the Com-
mission or by counsel for either party. In that case 
the Panel report was not sustained by competent 
evidence. The facts in this case are entirely differ-
ent. The Chairman of the Medical Panel was present, 
he was examined by the referee, very carefully cross-
examined by Plaintiff's attorney, and further exam-
ined by counsel for the State Insurance Fund. His 
testimony fully sustained the findings and conclu-
sions of the Medical Panel. Dr. Hebertson who was 
also a member of the Medical Panel was present and 
testified. The Commission strived earnestly to pro-
vide Plaintiff with a complete study of the medical 
aspects of her claim. Following the report of the 
original Medical Panel, and at the request of Plain-
tiff's attorney, two additional physicians were ap-
pointed to the Panel, Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a 
neurologist and Dr. Allen E. Lindsay, an internist. 
This enlarged Panel then made its report to the Com-
mission and found as follows: 
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( 1) This applicant's hospitalization on 
18 January 1962 was made necessary by this 
accident. This accident. resulted in temporary 
loss of control of her diabetes and care of her 
diabetes during this period of hospitalization 
was made necessary by this accident. The re-
lationship of her diabetes to this accident 
ceased at the time of her discharge from the 
hospital and the subsequent course and care of 
her diabetes since that time is not related to 
this accident. 
The Panel's findings in that paragraph were 
entirely in favor of the Plaintiff. In the next four 
paragraphs of its report the Panel found that: 
( 2) This applicant follows the natural 
history of most diabetics and appears to fol-
low the normal course of diabetes for her. 
There is no evidence of aggravation of her 
diabetic process as a result of this accident. 
(3) Total temporary disability as are-
sult of this accident ceased when she returned 
to work initially following this accident. 
( 4) There is no objective evidence of 
permanent disability as a result of this acci-
dent. 
(5) No further treatment is indicated 
as a result of this accident. 
It is well established that conflicts in the evi-
dence must be resolved by the Commission as stated 
in Norris vs. Industrial Commission, 90 U. 256, 261, 
61 P. 2d. 413: 
Again, therefore, we have the old case of 
a conflict of evidence which it is for the Com-
mission to resolve. 
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It was for the Commission to resolve the con-
flict in the evidence in this case. That it chose to 
accept the conclusions of the Medical Panel was not 
capricious or arbitrary. The members of the Panel 
were specialists in their fields, and the Commission 
chose to believe the testimony of the Panel doctors 
and report of the Panel. 
POINT 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS 
NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED TO FIND OR CON-
CLUDE THAT MARIAN SANDERSON'S 
TREATMENT FOR HER DIABETIC CONDI-
TION AFTER JUNE 13, 1962, WAS NECESSI-
TATED BY HER ACCIDENT OF JANUARY 18, 
1962. 
Basically the same situation exists in the case 
at bar, as has existed in a number of other cases 
which have been decided by this Court. One of the 
most recent was the case of Burton vs. Ind. Comm., 
13 Utah 2d 353, 37 4 P. 2d 439, which had many ele-
ments of simila~ity to the procedural situation exist-
ing in our present (Sanderson) case. Mr. Burton 
worked as an employee delivering beer. On the morn-
ing of October 30, 1959, after he had made his sec-
ond delivery in downtown Salt Lake City and re-
turned to his truck, he felt a severe pain in his chest. 
He went into the nearby Judge Building, where a 
doctor gave him some emergency treatment, and then 
called his family doctor, T. A. Clawson. Mr. Burton 
was taken to a hospital, where he died that after-
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noon, from coronary occlusion. After hearings by 
the Industrial Commission, and proceedings by a 
medical panel, the Commission denied the claim of 
Mrs. Burton, on the basis that the death did notre-
sult from an industrial accident. The Supreme Court 
of Utah upheld the Commission's denial. In the 
Court's opinion, among other things it said: 
In order to reverse the finding and order 
made the plaintiff must show that there is 
such credible uncontradicted evidence in her 
favor that the Commission's refusal to so find 
was capricious and arbitrary. * * * * She re-
lies upon the circumstances of the death de-
scribed above, coupled with the testimony of 
the family physician, Dr. Clawson. In res-
ponse to the question as to whether the de-
ceased's exertion in lifting and delivering the 
cases of beer was a contributing cause to the 
occurrence to Mr. Burton's heart attack and 
his death, the doctor answered that, "it could 
be a factor.'' 
As opposed to the evidence upon which 
plaintiff relied the Commission had before it 
the opinions of three members of the medical 
panel, together with the testimony of one of 
them, Dr. L. E. Viko, a well-known heart spe-
cialist. The substance of their opinions was 
that lVIr. Burton's coronary thrombosis with 
myocardial infarction was not caused by t~e 
exertion of his work that morning. In its deci-
sion the Commission recited, ''We chose to be-
lieve the testimony of Dr. L. E. Viko and the 
panel report.'' 
Assuming without deciding that the 
plaintiff's evidence would be sufficient to sus-
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tain a finding in her favor, it is indisputable 
that the testimony just referred to is sufficient 
to sustain a finding to the contrary. There be-
ing no basis upon which this court could say 
that the Commission acted capriciously, arbi-
trarily or unreasonably in denying the appli-
cation, its order is affirmed. 
Another case which involved the Industrial 
Commission's acceptance of one side of a conflict in 
the medical opinion evidence in the case, was Wood-
burn vs. Ind. Comm., 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 209. 
Paul Woodburn was employed as superintendent on 
the ski-lift construction job at Snow Basin. On July 
21, 1945 he rode a tractor to the upper terminal 
point, then he walked down the mountain to the low-
er terminal. When he arrived there, apparently he 
suffered a slight heart attack. For the next ten days 
he supervised the job from the lower level. On July 
31st he did some climbing on the hill. Shortly after-
wards he had severe pain under the breastbone. After 
a hearing and rehearing, the Commission denied Mr. 
Woodburn's claim. The Commission concluded that 
his coronary occlusion "was not caused by an acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of" his employ-
ment. In sustaining the Commission's decision, the 
Supreme Court of Utah (p. 396), referred to the ex-
pert medical testimony before the Commission. The 
medical testimony from four doctors was divided 
with respect to their opinions of the possible causa-
tion between the exertion and the heart attack. At 
page 399 of the Court's opinion, it quoted from a 
previous Utah case, Loran~ge vs. Ind. Comm., 107 
Utah 261, 152 P. 2d 272: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
Unless therefore it can be said, upon the 
whole re~ord, .. that the. ~o1nmi~sion ~learly 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously In making its 
findings and decision, this court is powerless 
to interfere. * * * * It was not intended, * * * * 
that this court, in matters of evidence, should 
to any extent substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the Commission. 
and at page 400 of the Court's opinion: 
There is substantial competent evidence 
(supplied by Drs. Walker and Olson) that in 
this case plaintiff's injury was not caused 
or contributed to by the physical effort he put 
forth on his job. The Commission, therefore, 
did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in de-
termining such to be the case. 
It should be kept in mind that the burden of 
proof is upon the applicant to establish her claim. 
Grasteit vs. Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 487, 290 Pac. 764; 
Wherritt vs. Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 68, 110 P. 2d. 
374. 
In the case of Kent vs. Ind. Comm., 89 Utah 
381, 57 P. 2d 724, pages 384-385 of the Court's opin-
ion contains the following language: 
When the Industrial Commission denies 
compensation and the case is brought to this 
court for review, a different type of search 
of the record is demanded than when the In-
dustrial Commission makes an award of com-
pensation and the record is likewise brought 
here for review. 
In the denial of compensation, the record 
must disclose that there is material, substan-
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tial, competent, uncontradicted evidence suf-
ficient to make a disregard of it justify the 
conclusion, as a matter of law, that the In-
dustrial Commission arbitrarily · and capri-
ciously disregarded the evidence or unreason-
ably refused to believe such evidence. 
With respect to the letter (R. 162-164), which 
Dr. A. F. Martin sent to Lionel M. Farr on June 18, 
1964; relating to Dr. Martin's examination of Mar-
ian L. Sanderson on April 21, 1964, and a copy of 
which letter Mr. Farr attached to his Petition for 
Writ of Review (R. 169); that letter is not properly 
a part of the Industrial Commission's record in this 
case, nor a proper part of the record now before the 
Supreme Court. 
At the end of the Industrial Commission's hear-
ing on Feb. 10, 1964 (R. 136), the applicant's attor-
ney said, "That's all." The defendants' attorney said, 
"That's all." The referee then said, "The Commis-
sion will take it under advisement." Nobody asked 
to be allowed to submit additional evidence. The case 
apparently was submitted by all parties for the Com-
mission's decision. 
Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, provides that 
when a case is brought to the Supreme Court for 
review. 
No new or additional evidence may be 
introduced in such Court, but the cause shall 
be heard on the record of the commission as 
certified by it. 
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The above mentioned letter from Dr. Martin to 
Mr. Farr, is certainly new and additional evidence. 
If that letter were considered to be part of the In-
dustrial Commission's record, there would never be 
an end to a hearing. After an applicant has had a 
hearing by the Industrial Commission and the case 
has been submitted for the Commission's decision, 
if the applicant and her attorney feel that their case 
would be strengthened by some additional evidence, 
do they have the right to obtain further examina-
tions or to obtain further statements or other evi-
dence and to merely mail such additional evidence 
to the Industrial Commission, without having given 
any notice to the defendants and without having 
given the defendants any opportunity to cross ex-
amine? The mere asking of the question shows the 
fallacy of such procedure. 
At the hearing on February 10, 1964, the In-
dustrial Commission properly accepted evidence re-
lating to the applicant's accident of January 18, 
1962, and the evidence relating to her condition and 
treatment prior to the day the hearing was being 
held. The issues which were at that time before the 
Industrial Commission involved questions as to 
whether the periods of te1nporary disability of Mar-
ian Sanderson from January 18, 1962 to January 
30, 1962, and from February 5, 1962 to February 
12, 1962, and from June 15, 1962 to July 4, 1962, 
and from December 8, 1962 to February 2, 1963, and 
from April 4, 1963 to May 20, 1963, (R. 130), were 
chargeable to her accident of January 18, 1962, or 
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whether they were periods of disability caused by 
her diabetic condition. 
The Medical Panel's report (R. 57-59) and the 
Industrial Commission's decision (R. 140-141) de-
cided that the first two periods of her disability, 
namely January 18, 1962 to January 30, 1962 and 
February 5, 1962 to February 12, 1962, were charge-
able to the accident of January 18, 1962. But the 
Panel and the Commission also decided that the later 
periods: commencing June 15, 1962 and ending May 
20, 1963, were not chargeable to her accident of 
January 18, 1962. The Panel and the Commission 
also decided that Marian Sanderson did not have 
any permanent disability chargeable to the accident. 
The Industrial Commission's determination of those 
points in issue, related to the time when the hearing 
was being held (February 10, 1964) and to all 
periods prior to that date. 
If the applicant (Plaintiff) claims that her con-
dition changed after the date of the hearing, it may 
be that she can invoke the Industrial Commission's 
"continuing jurisdiction" at some time in the future, 
under the provisions of Section 35-1-78 of the Work-
men's Compensation Law, and have the Commission 
consider such a claim for additional benefits. But 
the case which is now being reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of Utah involves only the record relating to 
Marian Sanderson's condition at the time of the hear-
ing on February 10, 1964 and prior thereto. The 
medical report of Dr. A. F. Martin ( R. 163) , is not 
a proper part of the record of this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and or-
der of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed 
by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CHARLES WELCH, JR., 
922 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
1660 Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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